What is happening is that as Russian air defenses are knocked out near the frontline it creates gaps in Russian air defenses. In general Ukraine has been far more sophisticated and effective at hunting down Russian artillery and air defenses than Russia has been at hunting down Ukrainian ones.
There is no way for Russia to monitor all of its territory thoroughly with radar, and so every one of these holes in the frontlines is a window. Given Ukraine’s sophisticated long range strike capacity things are quickly tilting in Ukraine’s favor as Ukraine progressively exploits more and more of those windows.
In general Operation Spiderweb was a demonstration of the fragility of fixed wing strike aircraft, they require large static infrastructure and given the extremely long range of Ukraine’s strike drones distance away from the frontline is no protection.
It has been amusing watching people forecast the end of the helicopter and attack helicopter and one of the crucial reasons that conclusion is so comically off the mark is that helicopters are simply more survivable than fast jets as they can be resupplied and supported in the field with mobile assets, it is much harder to pin a helicopter and associated logistics down to a reliable location that can be struck with a ballistic missile or some other decisive long range strike capability. Operation Spiderweb demonstrated that fast jets are incredibly vulnerable to sabotage and long range strike given their rigid requirements for operation (long run way etc…).
What is happening is that as Russian air defenses are knocked out near the frontline it creates gaps in Russian air defenses. In general Ukraine has been far more sophisticated and effective at hunting down Russian artillery and air defenses than Russia has been at hunting down Ukrainian ones.
There is no way for Russia to monitor all of its territory thoroughly with radar, and so every one of these holes in the frontlines is a window. Given Ukraine’s sophisticated long range strike capacity things are quickly tilting in Ukraine’s favor as Ukraine progressively exploits more and more of those windows.
In general Operation Spiderweb was a demonstration of the fragility of fixed wing strike aircraft, they require large static infrastructure and given the extremely long range of Ukraine’s strike drones distance away from the frontline is no protection.
It has been amusing watching people forecast the end of the helicopter and attack helicopter and one of the crucial reasons that conclusion is so comically off the mark is that helicopters are simply more survivable than fast jets as they can be resupplied and supported in the field with mobile assets, it is much harder to pin a helicopter and associated logistics down to a reliable location that can be struck with a ballistic missile or some other decisive long range strike capability. Operation Spiderweb demonstrated that fast jets are incredibly vulnerable to sabotage and long range strike given their rigid requirements for operation (long run way etc…).