Some key points

It is important to briefly cover who the operators of Russian SAMs are. Unlike the bulk of personnel in line units, SAM operators are overwhelmingly contract soldiers with significant technical and tactical training. Russian air defence systems have withstood modest damage [edit I might say “moderate” here? I wouldn’t call it “modest”] during the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, enabling the force to steadily build experience.

At the same time, the war has shown the dependence of the operators on operational integration to make the right decisions. When isolated, under pressure from multiple threats, faced with uncertainty as to the performance of their equipment, or simply exhausted, operators have made important errors, including shooting down friendly aircraft and even a civilian airliner.13 Understanding declining operator performance and their degree of confidence in their equipment is beyond the scope of this paper, but remains critical to effectively disrupting Russia’s IAMDS.

…

The Russians also rely on Western technologies to calibrate and measure the performance of their own radars. These are important for the initial acceptance of radars into service, but also for the continuous process of improving radar performance against threats.

…

Russia’s air defence enterprise is also vulnerable to physical attack, largely because of its concentration of functions around some key concerns. To take Pantsir complexes as an example, there are two primary KBP assembly sites: KBP’s main facility and Shcheglovsky Val (Figure 15). The cannons for Pantsir are produced by TulaTochMash and TsKBA, which also play a key role in the production of radars for the system. The primary assembly facilities, all located in Tula (Figure 15), are around 350 km from Ukraine and heavily defended. Ukraine’s attack drones lack sufficient payload or kinetic energy to damage many industrial targets and have so far failed to damage key facilities around Tula. However, as Ukraine’s stockpile of indigenous cruise missiles expands, the ability to reach and damage the relevant targets improves.

While the clustering of these sites enables the concentration of air defence, it also means that once the defences are saturated, all sites become vulnerable. Ukraine could, therefore, mount an operation to saturate the defences on an approach to Tula before delivering a significant blow to Pantsir production with cruise missiles – ironically resulting in limiting Russia’s ability to defend other targets over the course of 2026. These are but a fraction of the points of vulnerability identified in Russia’s integrated air defence production. A systematic effort to exploit these vulnerabilities could have a disproportionate impact on assisting Ukraine to strike the economic backbone of the Russian war effort and reduce the barriers to NATO airpower, consequently deterring future Russian aggression by denial

I am not sure I agree with RUSI that Russia is capable of sustaining this rate of loss of air defense systems, I can’t help but feel this article may have been partially in the works for quite awhile and the narrative in the last month or two has begun to shift to a point that while I don’t think any of the fundamental points of this article are wrong I do think it portrays Russia as much more capable of sustaining extensive air defenses losses than they are. The fact that Ukraine is able to hit these systems so regularly with cheap, inexpensive strike drones is itself a strategically unsustainable relationship for Russia and is indicative of the state of decay the Russian military is at. To be fair to the article it treats training as outside the scope of its consideration but I don’t know I just don’t think you can place training outside the scope of consideration when talking about air defense, air defense requires an ensemble of assets all working together that are trained in effectively collaborating to defeat waves of flying bombs, cruise missiles and other threats. It isn’t just that lots training is necessary to teach people how to know how to do their individual job with the equipment they are trained on in an air defense network, air defense is like making sure a boat has no leaks, it is a wholistic pursuit where if one part of the hull is bullshitting about not having a leak the whole ship sinks… and I think it is a very safe bet to say there is a metric fuckton of bullshitting about air defense in the Russian military (which isn’t to say that there aren’t also plenty of highly capable Russian air defenses and air defense crews especially on paper).

ALSO all the time and resources to adequately train air defense crews which I am entirely unconvinced Russia is capable of doing at the scale that is necessary to replace the high rate of systems being lost. There is likely a veteran core of air defense crews but I imagine they are vastly outnumbered by utterly incompetent crews manning functional air defense equipment as basically nothing more than glorified decoys.

You can hand a random person an AK47 and say “GO” and have some success at a very high cost, you can’t hand a random person a highly advanced air defense system and just tell them “GO” and have any degree of success however unless your objective is to accidentally shoot down more and more of your own aircraft.

Move fast, break things, pay fines, *make even your own family despise you for being a prick

fyi you didn’t link the url in the post you only pasted it in the body!

Remember, Russia is primarily relying on glide bombs to put artillery pressure on the front because Ukraine has so effectively denied Russia the ability to move its artillery into forward threatening positions.

Ukraine’s use of drones here thus could collapse the Russian war machine if Ukraine gets good enough at this.

I have made this point before but this is precisely why helicopters that can mount radars are more relevant than ever and more survivable than fixed wing aircraft, they aren’t tied to massive static airbases and infrastructure.

Unfortunately at least on the english speaking internet the overall quality of resources for this has plummeted. To be frank, I think a lot of this has to do with the necessary dumbing down that has been applied to the media over conversations about war ever since 9/11 sent authoritarianism in the US into overdrive and reduced justifications for military strikes into cartoonish cynical jokes, this process has reached an absolute peak in utterly denying the Palestinian Genocide and pretending it is a war and as a result discussion in english speaking media about ALL wars and conflicts right now has been reduced to baby like parroting of whatever the military and politicians say with no journalistic critique of the narrative being presented from a perspective of known established realities about war. “tanks are obsolete!” “helicopters are obsolete!!” “artillery is obsolete!” … it is honestly exhausting.

That coupled with enshittification makes this a very difficult time to find good information even as in many ways paradoxically there has never been better access to information.

That rant aside, this article is a good place to start

https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2025/04/28/european-drone-training-sites-mushroom-in-nod-to-ukraine-war-tactics/

In general I would pay attention to defense news websites and also note the general structure of joint european military exercises, they typically display the cohesive intention behind what can feel like meaningless unrelated details of arms procurement.

In a way I think the best way to put a picture together for yourself is to think of an abstracted idea of an armored brigade combat team with supporting drone, air and naval assets.

Armored Battalion (×2)

    Headquarters and Headquarters Company
    Tank Company (×2)
    Mechanized Infantry Company

Mechanized Infantry Battalion (×1)

    Headquarters and Headquarters Company
    Tank Company
    Mechanized Infantry Company (×2)

Cavalry Squadron (×1)

    Headquarters and Headquarters Troop
    Tank Troop (×2)
    Cavalry Troop (x2)

Field artillery (fires) battalion

    Headquarters and headquarters battery
        Target acquisition platoon
    M109 155 mm self propelled howitzer battery (×2)

Brigade engineer battalion

    Headquarters and headquarters company
    Combat engineer company
    Engineer support company
    Signal company
    Military intelligence company

Brigade Support Battalion

    Headquarters and Headquarters Company
    Distribution Company
    Field Maintenance Company
    Medical Company
        Headquarters Platoon
        Treatment Platoon
        Medical Evacuation Platoon
    Forward Support Company (Cavalry)
    Forward Support Company (Combined Arms) (×3)

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brigade_combat_team

Consider all the primary equipment needed for a wholistic “unit” of an equivalent fighting force along with drones, aircraft and navy if applicable. Don’t forget bridgelayers and logistics! In general, considering the largest militaries in Europe such as the German military then ask the basic question what is the state of that countries equipment for those major roles? What is the state of Germany’s Infantry Fighting Vehicle and Main Battle Tanks?

That is relatively easy to google and get good information on, it is easy to establish for example that the Lynx and Leopards are extremely advanced fighting vehicles that have undergone many series of modernizations. You can compare this to the UK whose Ajax IFV vehicles are so broken that they vibrate too violently for the soldiers inside to not be injured by it. From this perspective of evaluating the state of equipment programs things are much more accessible.

Poland and Germany are two easy to point to European nations that have massively increased the power of their military. Poland alone with its orders of K2 and Abrams tanks, piles and piles of AH-64 helicopters and plenty of ground based missile and tube artillery now represents an extremely intimidating military power. I suppose it might not all be deployable tomorrow, but the longterm trajectory is definitely not a slow, limping subdued reaction. Both HIMARS type rocket artillery and traditional cannon artillery are crucial types of equipment to consider as well and Europe has thoroughly rearmed itself with both and will continue to do so into the indefinite future I imagine.

Lastly consider fighter aircraft programs as they are a strategic asset, here is easiest you can find lots of news about the increase of fighter aircraft production and modernization in European militaries. The fact that Canada would even consider purchasing European fighter aircraft instead of US equivalents even as it is neighbors of the US, yes even given the political situation right now, says a lot in itself. I also think the ability of France to donate Mirage 2000-5F aircraft to Ukraine reveals a depth and breadth to Europe’s sophisticated fighter-bomber aircraft stock demonstrating a serious increase in strength. Military airlift is the other big aviation asset (especially considering the future dominant role of Rapid Dragon type systems) that people always overlook and there again Europe is in a stronger position than ever with the Airbus A400M.

Trump saying Europe is weak means he thinks they’re not racist and xenophobic enough.

That was clear from the context. The “strength” he wants to see is fascists thugs in charge, doing whatever Putin wants.

Yes, I just find it endlessly ironic that fascists are weak and awful at war because they are narrowly obsessed with the violence and the aesthetics of strength and don’t actually care about learning anything about how to be strong or integrating newly learned information into sustained training. People assume fascists will be good at war because it is what they are obsessed with it but this is like assuming that somebody who is a massive fan of a sports team is automatically good at that sport, just because someone dresses up in the clothes professionals wear and spouts knowledge about the profession doesn’t make them into a professional in that realm (I am looking at you specifically Pete Hegseth when I spit on the ground).

Fascism is weakness, both morally and physically. Fascism will eat a military from the inside out and waste vast amounts of resources and human lives on utterly useless military strategies if those strategies fit the ideals of fascism, consequences and reality be damned fascists don’t care.

The real horror is the trend. Between 2009 and 2023, pedestrian deaths rose a staggering 80%, while all other traffic fatalities increased just 13%. In a decade-plus span, pedestrians have been dying at a rate nearly seven times faster than population growth. This isn’t random. It’s the intentional outcome of systems designed to prioritize vehicles over people.

Shameful and pathetic, what a material abandonment of the social contract.

if i consider the impact of going from “drinking age laws existing” to “no laws existing at all”… would i be surprised to see a surge in drinking sales for minors? no.

If that occurred that would only conclusively prove an abrupt non-linear change may be bad with a law that impacts so many people and aspects of society…?

By the time Florida will be able to fix all the problems locked in right now by their willful ignorance the state will be largely underwater from sea level rise. I wish this was hyperbole but depressingly it isn’t. Whoever may read this that lives in Florida, leave Florida if you can I implore you. Florida, much like Texas, is a multi-layered multidimensional Death Cult, except Florida will collapse from being submerged under water rather than from running out of water as Texas will.

remember the principle of “sooner than expected” here for climate change too, we are absolutely underestimating these things

https://www.researchgate.net/figure/Florida-base-map-showing-extent-of-submergence-associated-with-an-atmospheric-temperature_fig1_269420499

For a laugh, a scoping review of social media and adolescent risks through 2022. Sure, plenty of questions on causality, but also quantitative articles on direct impacts to physical health and harmful exposure to constant ads. In dozens of articles, just 1 (one) article finding a positive socializing impact… I’m certainly leaning towards denial by default…

Wait… why would a scoping review of risks necessarily include evidence of a positive socializing impact? It is by definition a review of risks…?

If you can actually show me that it saves queer kids from oppression in a way that couldn’t be done via other methods (school programs, library funding, safe and child friendly neighborhoods, media representation, etc.) then maybe we shouldn’t throw the baby out with the bath water.

No, the onus is on you to prove your points before you assert something you potentially have no sufficient alternative for should be denied.

Here is a place for you to start educating yourself!

This review identified LGBTQ youths’ uses of social media to connect with like-minded peers, manage their identity, and seek support. In the few studies that considered mental health outcomes (5/26, 19%), the use of social media appeared to be beneficial to the mental health and well-being of this group [11,34,44,55,60]. In this systematic review, we identified the various important beneficial roles of social media, but the findings were limited by weaknesses in the evidence base. This information may be useful for professionals (eg, educators, clinicians, and policy makers) working with LGBTQ youth to consider the appropriate use of social media in interventions as it provides an evidence base for the role of social media in the lives of LGBTQ youths. These findings help further understand how LGBTQ youths use social media and its positive and negative impacts on their mental health and well-being. Further research is required to provide stronger evidence of how social media is used for connectivity, identity, and support and determine causal links to mental health outcomes. We recommend larger, representative, and prospective research, including intervention evaluation, to better understand the potential of social media to support the health and well-being of marginalized LGBTQ young people. It is imperative that social media is understood and its beneficial use is supported to ensure improved outcomes.

https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC9536523/

Edit here is another

Just as the American Academy of Pediatrics has called for rethinking the shame-based narrative of a developmentally appropriate use of social media [33] clinicians might consider both the risks and benefits that social media use can have for youth and adults. Clinicians can work closely with local community organizations and advocate for positive policy change to better support LGBTQ + youth. There is a need for more research on BIPOC LGBTQ + adolescents as the intersectionality of their identities brings nuance to the interactions on social media and the impact this has on those populations [3, 4, 13, 15, 29]. There is also a shortage of research involving LGBTQ + youth of intersectional backgrounds, including rural, racial/ethnic minority, gender minority, and neurodivergent youth. Researchers are developing new tools like the Social Media Benefits Scale (SMBS) that can be used as a clinical tool to help develop and implement a social media strategy to give a new multidimensional way for professional practitioners to develop strategies for interventions [34]. Additionally, there are increasing digital modalities to mitigate the disproportionate high rate of online victimization and suicidal risk for LGBTQ + youth. At the University of Pittsburgh, an app called Flourish is being developed through codesigning to augment schools and mental health services for LGBTQ + youth who face online victimization [35]. Other digital interventions are being designed with LGBTQ + youth feedback, and concluded that tech-based tools, such as apps and chatbots, offer immediate, non-judgmental feedback but can feel impersonal [15]. Understanding informal learning and non-clinical contexts that can help shape the mental wellbeing of LGBTQ + youth will be critical. For instance, virtual camps during the COVID-19 pandemic that celebrated the LGBTQ + identity development and supported social network development reported longitudinally reduced depressive symptoms, friendship formation, and positive changes in self-esteem [36, 37]. This is an initiative that could be specialized to outreach underserved LGBTQ + communities such as rural BIPOC adolescents.

https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s40124-024-00338-2

Edit 2 another

Social media can provide benefits for some youth by providing positive community and connection with others who share identities, abilities, and interests. It can provide access to important information and create a space for self-expression.9 The ability to form and maintain friendships online and develop social connections are among the positive effects of social media use for youth.18, 19 These relationships can afford opportunities to have positive interactions with more diverse peer groups than are available to them offline and can provide important social support to youth.18 The buffering effects against stress that online social support from peers may provide can be especially important for youth who are often marginalized, including racial, ethnic, and sexual and gender minorities.20, 21, 22 For example, studies have shown that social media may support the mental health and well-being of lesbian, gay, bisexual, asexual, transgender, queer, intersex and other youths by enabling peer connection, identity development and management, and social support.23 Seven out of ten adolescent girls of color report encountering positive or identity-affirming content related to race across social media platforms.24 A majority of adolescents report that social media helps them feel more accepted (58%), like they have people who can support them through tough times (67%), like they have a place to show their creative side (71%), and more connected to what’s going on in their friends’ lives (80%).25 In addition, research suggests that social media-based and other digitally-based mental health interventions may also be helpful for some children and adolescents by promoting help-seeking behaviors and serving as a gateway to initiating mental health care.8, 26, 27, 28, 29

https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK594763/#ch1.s1

This is complicated, you can’t just take away a thing that for many vulnerable people may be a lifeline and just handwave and say “well we should be solving the problem with other methods anyways!”, these are problems now that need addressing now, your dismissal is irrelevant to the people who are isolated and who could find connection through the internet that you are advocating for denying because it isn’t the right way to solve the problem in your opinion.

Pretty vague but let me make the best out of it. I’d rather prefer my kids to physically explore the world and socialize rather than forming opinions of it and the society through an echo chamber on a 6 inch screen.

So by this logic you don’t like your kids spending too much time reading books either?

The stuff that causes a lot of the harm is just what people tend to do online, because humans broadly are not meant to substitute real social connections for whatever is happening when we scroll and type and read other people’s thoughts and fantasies and depressed manifestos of strangers every day.

Where is your hard evidence of this? Can you not make the same argument about a book? A TV? You cannot assert a statement like this as if it was indisputable fact.

Oh come on use your damn brain you are smarter than this, imagine growing up as a queer kid in the middle of nowhere in a very conservative community, can you really not get it through your head that maybe just maybe then the internet might be a lifeline for kids like that? Yes the internet is toxic, but that doesn’t mean the internet isn’t also a vital lifeline for countless very isolated people… who are isolated against their will.

Then why are you here!!!?? I don’t get this blanket cynicism for social media, if you don’t like it as a concept than why the hell are you here? Please leave if you truly feel that social media is inherently bad, you are just a toxic influence on this social media community at a fundamental level if that is actually how you feel. Otherwise if you are going to stay you need to think more critically about this and nuance your views.

Wait, do you honestly believe that drinking age laws like the US has leads to less alcoholism, less underage drinking and less deaths from teenagers overdosing on alcohol?

Are you out of your mind?

Mankind isn’t cut out for so much information and communication.

You don’t get to decide that for other people

It also speaks to how quietly powerful Ukraine has become as an international military power, which might seem like an exaggeration to say but you have to step back and think about how deep of a problem littoral security has been for naval empires in the 20th and 21st century. The US really didn’t ever figure it out, the Littorial Combat Ship class was an utter failure and if it weren’t for helicopters basically being a cheat code for many dynamic situations there likely would have been a lot more blowback against the US Navy during the height of its unipolar global power for failing to extend the power projection of naval power to atomized littoral contexts or account for the true degree of vulnerability in littoral environments that large open ocean vessels inherently have.

Any economic trading power in the world that isn’t laser focused on how unmanned vehicles are being used to successfully stabilize and destablize maritime shipping littoral security in the Ukraine war is being foolish and there really isn’t anything to learn from the Russian side here, just the Ukrainian side…

Yes the international community can just watch Ukraine and copy their tactics and technology, but undeniably Ukraine has become at least the temporary center of littoral naval power going into the 21st century. In a modern context no other nation’s military has been subjected to such granular mass infiltration attacks along its littoral borders and managed to so effectively turn the tables with drones and new tactics and the implications for establishing security in littoral environments will echo throughout the rest of this century.

TL;DR Don’t underestimate how valuable Ukraine’s knowledge of how to defend ports and waterways from small unit infiltration and sabotage attacks is, it is a stupendously valuable knowledge skillset that Ukraine has honed both sides of the coin of, both as the defender and the attacker. It wasn’t a given this would happen and Ukraine deserves an immense amount of credit for achieving such a high degree of proficiency at it.

The idea that Europe is weak is hilarious. Russia invading Ukraine has caused a general rearmament in Europe, this in itself wouldn’t make Europe strong but in general European militaries have been proactive about evolving their military technology and doctrine in mostly rational ways and as a result Europe is now a dense fabric of extremely advanced militaries informed by experience from the Ukraine war.

Since WW2 Europe has never been more militarily powerful compared to the US and Russia than it is now. See the rapid development and scaling up of Bohdana 155mm howitzers to 40+ systems a month as one intimidating example.

…which of course is exactly why Trump is insisting Europe is weak lol

Note, I am not arguing the US should cut aid to Ukraine.