Can anyone provide some level analysis as to why they would do this? This seems to be directly contrary to EU and western integration efforts. There has to be some kind of perceived upside or justification, right?

The National Anticorruption Bureau and the Special Anticorruption Prosecutor have always been somewhat under the control and supervision of the national Prosecutor General and the Verkhovna Rada. Mostly independent, but requiring a certain amount of oversight and control, as all public agencies surely must.

The new law is not “anti-NABU,” in some sweeping sense. It simply places the NABU and the SAP office more firmly under the direct control of the Prosecutor General. The existing heads of these agencies are unhappy with that, which is not unreasonable… but they also have a really big problem right now.

The problem is that the national security service just busted several prominent members of the NABU and the SAPO for being Russian agents. The bureau head and the Special Prosecutor have not, as far as I know, contested those allegations at all. In fact the SSU claims that the agency heads knew about the allegations already but did not protest them nor act on them at the time.

This creates the impression that the agency heads knew about it, accepted it as true, and chose to do nothing until the SSU acted.

Needless to say this has raised some eyebrows. The Rada as one of the main existing oversight bodies for the anticorruption agencies is bound to be unhappy with this revelation.

And it’s very bad for an argument that you must remain unsupervised and nearly completely autonomous in order to remain pure and uncompromised, if it turns out that you yourself were actually thoroughly compromised all along.

So… what is going on? Did the SSU make up the allegations? NABU and SAPO do not claim so. Is this some distraction to protect an anti-corruption investigation target? Such a high-profile move does not seem likely to lead to less scrutiny.

Or… is it what it seems? A serious problem with GRU infiltration, under cover of agency autonomy and independence from oversight, that requires rethinking how the agencies should work?

dismantling independent institutions before negotiations is a preemptive move to protect one’s own interests.

Control over the negotiator = control over the results Peace negotiations will require concessions: perhaps territorial, neutrality, amnesty, restrictions on the armed forces.

If various Ukrainian actors (reformers, opposition, prosecutors, journalists, civil society) participate in the negotiations, Zelensky’s team loses leverage.

But if Zelensky’s circle monopolizes the negotiating team, documents, and communications, they can:

Hide concessions

Drag out or falsify internal consultations

Offer personal guarantees (e.g., amnesty for collaborators)

Form an international version of events

Remember how the Minsk agreements were signed — behind closed doors, without real control. This model may return.

Preventing leaks from independent structures The National Anti-Corruption Commission, the Prosecutor General’s Office, and investigative journalists pose a threat to secret diplomacy.

If the agreement includes:

Compensation from Western funds for oligarchs or officials

Legalization of the loss of territories

Amnesty for collaborators

Guarantees of security from corrupt individuals

→ and this becomes known in advance — public anger may disrupt the agreement.

Closing or neutralizing these structures eliminates internal sabotage of the negotiations.

Avoid legal consequences after the deal Imagine that Ukraine signs a peace agreement that:

Implements a “special status” or cultural/political zones of the Russian Federation in the East

Removes responsibility from collaborators

Redistributes confiscated property to achieve peace

The NACP or SAPO may regard this as abuse of power, treason, or illicit enrichment. Zelensky’s team needs to protect itself from:

Future courts

International tribunals (with internal leaks)

Political revenge after the deal

Without anti-corruption structures — without responsibility — deals can be concluded without fear.

Monopoly on information = legitimacy Negotiations are also psychological warfare.

If the team controls the media, the prosecutor’s office, and the parliament, it will be able to:

Present concessions as “victory”

Discredit the opposition (“traitors,” “Kremlin agents”)

Sell a difficult peace as “strategic patience” or a “phased return plan”

This is important, because Ukrainians will not accept betrayal unless it is presented as a sacrifice for the country.