The threshold the Israeli authorities have set for the use of a nuclear weapon is dangerously low.

Israeli strategic thinking has long been shaped by the fear of an existential threat. Unlike most nuclear states, whose doctrines revolve around deterrence or competition with other nuclear powers, Israel’s security narrative is rooted in the belief that the country could face destruction if a war turns decisively against it. Israeli leaders have repeatedly framed regional conflicts — from the wars of 1967 and 1973 to present confrontations with Iran and armed groups in Gaza and Lebanon — as struggles for national survival. That mindset matters enormously when nuclear weapons are involved.

  • 🌞 Alexander Daychilde 🌞@lemmy.world
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    22 hours ago

    Your question was addressed in the article:

    The intensity of the bombardment has been extraordinary. Some military analysts estimate that the explosive power dropped on Gaza during the early stages of the war alone amounted to several times the explosive yield of the Hiroshima atomic bomb.

    The comparison does not suggest equivalence between nuclear and conventional weapons. The devastation of a nuclear detonation would be vastly greater. But it does reveal something important about the scale of force Israeli leaders have been willing to deploy when they believe national security is at stake. If a state is willing to unleash such overwhelming destruction through conventional means, the uncomfortable question arises: what would its threshold be if it believed it was actually losing a war?